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Ambiguity and Partisan Business Cycles
Anna Maffioletti and Michele Santoni*
We introduce ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) into a stripped-down
version of Alesina’s (1987) partisan model of the business cycle. We
show that, if the private sector’s subjective expectations of future
events are ambiguous, there is the possibility of a political business
cycle, even when the parties running for the election have similar
preferences for inflation and unemployment. In particular, if inflation
is perceived as a loss, then the larger the fraction of the population
that is ambiguity-prone (-averse), the larger is the postelection boom
(slump), with unemployment then returning back to its natural level.
We also show that, for given parties’ preferences, ambiguity prone-
ness (aversion) implies smaller (larger) fluctuations in the unemploy-
ment around its natural level when the right-wing party wins the
elections. (JEL: D81, E32, E42; Keywords: Ambiguity, Ellsberg’s para-
dox, Partisan theory of the business cycle, Unemployment)
1. Introduction
One of the novelties of European politics in the 1990s seems to be the
emergence of a “new free-market left” that often talks the same language
of the liberal right in economics. Notable examples include New Labour in
Britain and the Olive Tree coalition in Italy. Both announced their com-
mitment towards antiinflation policies and privatization, and took steps to
make it credible (as, e.g., the instrument independence given to the Bank of
England in the aftermath of the 1997 U.K. election). These episodes seem
to suggest a convergence of economic-policy objectives between the new
free-market left and the liberal right in Europe.
This convergence in objectives has important implications for the way
many economists perceive the influence of politics on the business cycles.
A large part of the literature considers how an incumbent government
can use monetary policy for exploiting, temporarily or permanently, an
inflation–unemployment trade-off.One popularmodel is the rational parti-
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san theory of Alesina (1987), which builds on Hibbs (1977). Partisan politi-
cians have different objective functions, with left-wing politicians being
more concerned about the welfare loss of unemployment than right-wing
politicians. If wage-setters have rational expectations and sign noncontin-
gent nominal wage contracts at discrete intervals, occurring just before
and after the elections, Alesina shows that uncertainty about the election
outcome generates higher (lower) than expected inflation if the left-wing
(right-wing) party wins, which implies a postelection boom (slump). After
the election has occurred, wage-setters correctly revise their expectations,
and unemployment returns to its natural rate, such that the time-consistent
inflation rate is higher (lower) under the left (right).
Alesina et al. (1997, ch. 6) present empirical evidence from a panel of
OECD countries for the years 1960–1993 in favor of this theory, “particu-
larly for countries with a two-party system or with clearly identifiable right
and left coalitions.” Persson and Tabellini (1999, pp. 1404, 1416) also argue
that postelection partisan cycles in real variables and inflation have been
one of the basic stylized facts of postwar monetary policy in the above
countries1. However, casual observations seem to suggest that the rational
partisan theory is less equipped to explain recent episodes. For instance, in
1996 the election of a new conservative government in Spainwas associated
with a postelection boom (albeit small), whereas that of a new center-left
government in Italy was associated with a postelection slump2. Moreover,
if, between competing parties, there is convergence in objectives for in-
flation and unemployment, the rational partisan theory predicts that the
size of the cycle should be reduced and eventually eliminated3. Finally, this
theory does not allow for the persistence of unemployment, which seems
a well-established empirical fact, at least in Europe4.
In order to tackle some of these empirical puzzles, the present paper in-
troduces the concept of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity into a stripped-
down version ofAlesina (1987)5. InAlesina (1987), the probability distribu-
tion over unknown electoral outcomes is exogenously given and common
knowledge. The present paper allows for decision-makers (namely, wage-
setters) to faceKnightianuncertainty (namely, unknownprobabilities) over
1 See Drazen (2000, pp. 260–268) for a critical assessment of the evidence.
2 For Spain, the difference between the average GDP growth rate in the first six quarters
after the election and in the first six quarters before the election was 0.38; for Italy, the
same difference was −1.69.
3 Alesina et al. (1997, pp. 261–262) dispute the claim that convergence in objectives has
been taking place.
4 Alogouskofis et al. (1992) generate unemployment persistence by introducing insider–
outsider features in the rational partisan model; see also Jonsson (1997).
5 Note that our concept of ambiguity differs from the one used by Alesina and Cukierman
(1990); the latter refers to the risk associated with the policymaker type, rather than to
uncertainty about the state of the world that will prevail.
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electoral outcomes, rather than a risky choice where the full probability
distribution is known (see Ellsberg, 1961). The main result of the paper is
that the presence of ambiguity-averse or -prone wage-setters, by biasing
inflation expectations relative to rational expectations, can change, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, the nature of partisan business cycles in
predictable ways. In particular, under certain conditions, there is the pos-
sibility both that victory by the right can induce a postelection boom (see
Proposition 1 below) and that partisan business cycles occur even with full
policy convergence (see Proposition 3 below).
The use of Knightian uncertainty is motivated by the belief that a polit-
ical election can often be considered as a genuinely ambiguous event. In
general, there is decision-making under ambiguity, when the information
possessed by the decision-makers on the occurrence of some event is scarce,
irrelevant, or conflicting. If this is the case, the decision-makers may not be
able to form subjective probabilities on the occurrence of such an event.
In the case of a political election, polls may give an estimate of a party’s
probability of victory to wage-setters forming inflation expectations, but
they are often imprecise, and may fail to predict the correct results, even
on the election eve (see Jowell et al., 1993, for the 1992 U.K. election)6.
Ambiguity can be especially relevant when the parties running for election
are new (e.g., Forza Italia and Ulivo in Italy) or have new leaderships (e.g.,
New Labour in the U.K.), which may increase the fraction of the unde-
cided in preelection polls7. Moreover, when the environment is new, we
may expect individuals to experience difficulties in assessing probabilities
over events, and to feel unconfident about having a complete description
of all the possible states of the world.
In order to model ambiguity, the present paper adopts Einhorn and
Hogarth’s (1985) “anchoring and adjustment”model (see below). The basic
idea is that, when assessing probabilities, wage-setters apply a twofold
process: firstly, they anchor their judgmental probability to some common-
knowledge probability estimate of the likelihood of victory for one of the
two parties (here, the mean value of a uniform probability distribution
over the unit interval, implying an anchor probability value of p = 0. 5).
Second, they adjust this anchor value to reflect the ambiguity present in the
6 Bohm and Sonnergard (1999, pp. 205–208) give further references about polls’ lack of
prediction accuracy.
7 As Ellsberg (1961, pp. 660–661) puts it, “Ambiguity is a subjective variable, but it should
be possible to identify ‘objectively’ some situations likely to present high ambiguity, by
noting situations where available information is scanty or obviously unreliable or highly
conflicting; or where expressed expectations of different individuals differ widely; or
where expressed confidence in estimates tends to be low....Thus as compared with the ef-
fects of...well-known random processes (like coin-flipping or roulette)... the performance
of a new President, or the tactics of an unfamiliar opponent are all likely to appear am-
biguous.” (Emphasis added.)
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election. As long as uncertainty lowers the confidence in their assessment
of the probability, wage-setters simulate probability values different from
the anchor: ambiguity reaction is then captured by introducing nonlinear
decision weights instead of probabilities8. The direction and size of these
simulations, or the shape of the weighting function, may differ according
to the individual attitudes: both rational and nonrational wage-setters may
operate in the economy, and the latter can be either uncertainty-averse or
-prone (see below)9. Therefore, the use of such a model will allow us to
make a direct comparison between the results of our paper and Alesina’s
(1987).
In the current paper, we shall also assume that the wage-setters perceive
inflation as a loss, thus ex ante preferring the victory of the low-inflation,
right-wing party. As Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Gru¨ner and Hefeker
(1999) point out in the literature on unionized labor markets andmonetary
policy, union members may dislike inflation as long as their pensions and
other savings are not fully indexed or not indexed at all. This may be
particularly relevant for countries like Italy, where more than half of the
totalmembers of the two leading confederations are pensioners andwhere,
from 1992 on, index linking of benefits to real wages has been abolished
and index linking to CPI inflation has been reduced10.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces ambiguity into
a stripped-down version of Alesina (1987). Section 3 studies the issue of
convergence in objectives. Section 4 concludes with final remarks.
2. The Model
2.1. A Standard Model
There are three agents: the private sector and the left-wing (L) and right-
wing (R) parties. The timing of events is as follows. Before the election, at
8 Other theories of ambiguity reaction use decision weights instead of probabilities; see
Schmeidler (1989), Tversky and Kanheman (1992), and Tversky and Wakker (1995). Ac-
cording to these models, a single prospect (x A; 0 B) (i.e., prize x is obtained if event A
occurs; nothing is obtained if B occurs) is evaluated by w(A)v(x) + w(B)v(0), where the
decision weights w(A) and w(B) (i.e., the psychological likelihood assigned to the events
A and B) may not be additive: if A and B are two disjoint events, w(A) + w(B) may differ
from unity.
9 A growing amount of experimental evidence shows that individuals’ attitude toward am-
biguity depends on whether they perceive the outcome as a gain or as a loss, and on
the level of probability; see for example Hogarth and Einhorn (1990), Tversky and Fox
(1995), Di Mauro and Maffioletti, (1996), and Wu and Gonzalez (1999). Camerer and
Weber (1992) survey the earlier experimental literature on uncertainty reaction.
10 Chiarini (1999) argues that pensioners’ political influence on the Italian trade-union con-
federation had increased in the 1990s and shows that it significantly accounts for part of
the observed real wage moderation during this period.
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time t = 0, the private sector forms a subjective inflation expectation for the
subsequent period, and workers sign noncontingent nominal-wage contracts
for t = 1 on the basis of this expectation11. The private sector is fully aware
of the preferences of the two parties towards inflation and unemployment.
However, it does not know with certainty which party is going to win the
election. Then, the election takes place, and the winning party stays in power
for two periods. Subsequently, at t = 1, the new government implements its
desired inflation (monetary) policy for its first period of tenure, the private
sector forms a subjective inflation expectation for the second period, and
new nominal-wage contracts are signed for t = 2. Finally, at t = 2, the in-
cumbent government implements its desired inflation (monetary) policy for
that period. Therefore, we consider the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
one-shot, two-stage inflation policy game with one-period predetermined
nominal wages.
The economy is described by a short-run Phillips curve
Ut = UN + a(ΠEt − Πt), (1)
where a > 0 is a constant supply response parameter, and Ut , UN , Πt, ΠEt
are the actual and natural rates of unemployment, the actual inflation rate,
and the private sector’s subjective expectation of the inflation rate for time t,
formed at time t − 1, respectively12.Wemodel expected inflation below.Each
party aims at minimizing the following static loss function:
Lit = (Πt)2 + bi(Ut − U∗), (2)
where t = {1,2}, i = {L,R}, and bL > bR > 0. That is, party L cares more than
party R about the welfare costs of unemployment. For simplicity, both par-
ties have the same inflation and unemployment targets: zero inflation and
U∗ < UN respectively. The unemployment target is below its natural rate,
because of distortions in the economy, which politicians feel unable to elimi-
nate directly by using supply-side policies13. Clearly, this assumption implies
that the discretionary equilibriumwill be characterizedby a positive inflation
bias, with respect to the second-best optimal precommitted equilibrium of
zero inflation.
We solve the model by backward induction. Taking inflation expectations
as given, the winning party minimizes the loss function (2) subject to the
short-run Phillips curve (1), which yields the following time-consistent dis-
11 Drazen (2000, pp. 254–255) summarizes the pitfalls of such an assumption; see also sec-
tion 3 below.
12 The short-run Phillips curve is independent of exogenous shocks, since our focus is on
policy-induced cycles.
13 U* can be interpreted as the Walrasian natural rate of unemployment.
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cretionary inflation rate:
Π it =
abi
2
, i = {L, R}. (3)
Of course, our assumption that the loss function (2) is linear in unemploy-
ment deviations from the target implies a constant inflation policy: the policy
rule (3) is independent of the private sector’s inflation expectations14. More-
over, given that U∗ < UN , and that there is no possibility of precommitment,
(3) represents the standard inflation bias.
2.2. Introducing Ambiguity
To this point, the model is standard. Our departure from previous models
of partisan political business cycles consists in assuming that the decision-
makers face ambiguity. Before the election has occurred, the private sector’s
decision-makers form their inflation expectation for the next period, knowing
the inflation policy rule (3) that each party will implement in the case of an
election victory, but being uncertain about the election outcome.
We assume that the decision-makers prefer low to high inflation, ir-
respective of the actual rate of unemployment: their preferred election
outcome is party R’s victory. In other words, we assume that inflation is
perceived as a loss (even if it was perfectly anticipated). Therefore, the
decision-makers would like inflation to be as low as possible15. This may
be the case if the decision-makers are composed of many identical (ex-
cept for their subjective perception of ambiguity; see below), uncoordi-
nated, insider-dominated trade unions, who dislike inflation because they
care about the real wages, nonindexed benefits, and pensions of their em-
ployed and retiredmembership; seeCukiermanandLippi (1999) andGru¨ner
and Hefeker (1999)16. Alternatively, the private sector may be composed of
the financial markets that dislike inflation: uncoordinated wage-setters sign
their nominal-wage contracts following the inflation forecast of the mar-
kets.
We allow for different subjective reactions to ambiguity. In particular, we
assume that a fraction 1 − k of the decision-makers are ambiguity-neutral –
14 This follows Alesina (1987). In an appendix, available from the authors on request, we
show that our results are qualitatively unchanged if the loss function is quadratic in un-
employment deviations from target instead.
15 Recent studies on the perceived costs of inflation conclude that “people find inflation
costly, and are willing to undergo a recession to get rid of price increases” (see Di Tella et
al., 2001, for econometric evidence) even if this means “that millions more people would
be unemployed” (see Shiller, 1996, p. 19, for survey evidence).
16 These papers, however, assume explicitly that the typical union’s linear–quadratic loss
function depends negatively on the real wage and positively on both unemployment and
inflation.
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that is, they have rational expectations – and that the remaining fraction k
are either ambiguity-averse or -prone; see below. The expected inflation rate
for time t is
ΠEt = (1 − k)
[
pLΠLt + (1 − pL)ΠRt
]+ k[s(pL)ΠLt + s(1 − pL)ΠRt ]. (4)
Expected inflation is a weighted arithmetic average of the subjective in-
flation expectations of the two types of decision-makers. These subjective
expectations depend on the time-consistent inflation rates of the two parties,
and on the common-knowledge probability assigned to the victory of party
L, pL, which represents the anchor value of the probability associated with
the worst outcome (i.e., that the high-inflation L party wins the election).
Such an anchor value is established in relation to the information set before
the election, which may include electoral polls. It is convenient to think of
pL as themean of the probability distribution of the electoral outcome, i.e., as
the probability assigned to party L’s victory when the decision-makers have
rational expectations. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that pL is
uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1], so that its mean is equal to one-
half before the election takes place. After the election has taken place, the
decision-makers know with certainty who is in power, and this probability
anchor is revised upward (downward) to unity (zero) if party L is in (out of)
office.
If the anchor probability value is then adjusted upward or downward
depending on the decision-makers’ subjective attitude towards ambiguity,
then according to our model s(pL)will represent the weight associated to
party L’s victory, or the anchor, while s(1 − pL)will be that associated to the
complementary event of party R’s victory.
Therefore, consistentlywith Einhorn andHogarth (1985),we assume that,
when assessing probabilities, the decision-makers apply a twofold process.
First, they anchor their judgmental probability to some value, here the mean
of the probability distribution of the election victory for the L party; sec-
ond, they adjust this anchor value to reflect the ambiguity present in the
situation. Because of probability adjustment, it turns out that the sum of the
probabilities of the complementary events can be either subadditive (i.e.,
their sum is less than unity) or superadditive (i.e., their sum is greater than
unity): nonadditivity in probabilities reveals individual reaction to uncer-
tainty17.
17 This process is also consistent with individual behavior leading to Ellsberg’s well-known
two-urn paradox; see Ellsberg (1961, pp. 650–653).
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Following Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), we specify the two weights as
being
s(pL) = pL + θ[(1 − pL) − (pL)], (5.1)
s(1 − pL) = 1 − pL + θ[pL − (1 − pL)]. (5.2)
As long as inflation is perceived as a loss (i.e., as a negative payoff),
we define a decision-maker to be ambiguity-neutral if s(pL) = pL, and to
be ambiguity-averse [or -prone] if s(pL) > pL [or s(pL) < pL]18: ambiguity
aversion [proneness] implies that the private sector overestimates [under-
estimates] the anchor probability of the worst outcome. The parameter θ,
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, captures the amount of ambiguity perceived in the situ-
ation by the decision-makers, which we shall henceforth call objective am-
biguity. In particular, it represents the elevation of the weighting function,
namely, the size of the simulated probability values different from the an-
chor (i.e., the greater the perceived ambiguity, the greater is the size of
the simulation). When θ = 0, there is no ambiguity. From (5), it follows that
s(pL) = pL, s(1 − pL) = 1 − pL: complementary probability weights are addi-
tive; the decision-makers act as if they were expected-utilitymaximizers, and
(4) is equivalent to rational expectations. When θ > 0, the decision-makers
do not possess all the information necessary to make a decision.When θ = 1,
they have no information at all and must make a choice under complete ig-
norance. Therefore, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 captures how ambiguous the event election is
for all of the decision-makers.
The parameter  ≥ 0 indicates the private sector’s psychological atti-
tude toward ambiguity, namely the curvature of the weighting function,
which we shall henceforth call subjective ambiguity. When  = 1, the pri-
vate sector gives equal weight to adjustments below and above the an-
chor. When  < 1 ( > 1), the private sector attaches more weight to ad-
justments below (above) the anchor.With pL = 1/2, it turns out that s(pL) =
(1/2){1 + θ[1 − (1/2)−1]} = s(1 − pL). That is,  = 1 implies s(pL) = pL or
ambiguity neutrality, and  > 1 ( < 1) implies s(pL) > pL (s(pL) < pL) or
ambiguity aversion (proneness)19.
Figure 1 plots the weighting function s(pL) under different assumptions
as regards , while keeping θ > 0 constant.
18 In the case of gains (i.e., positive payoffs), ambiguity aversion implies s(p) < p, and prone-
ness s(p) > p.
19 In Einhorn and Hogarth (1985),  < 1 [or  > 1] implies subadditive [or superadditive]
decision weights: s(pL) + s(1 − pL) < 1 [or s(pL) + s(1 − pL) > 1]. However, in the
current model, the equivalence between subadditivity [superadditivity] of the decision
weights and ambiguity proneness [aversion] in the case of losses is not necessarily valid
when the value of the anchor probability differs from p = 1/2.
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Figure 1
Different Weighting Functions S(p) that are Determined by Differences in the
Individual Values of , while Keeping Constant the Level of Objective Uncer-
tainty θ > 0
These features of the model imply that the k decision-makers will expect
more (less) inflation than the ambiguity-neutral residual fraction, 1− k, when
they are ambiguity-averse (-prone).
Using (4) and (5), it follows that the expected inflation rate for t = 1,
formed before the election takes place, and that for t = 2, formed after it has
taken place, are, respectively,
ΠE1 = (1 − k)
[
ΠR + ΠL
2
]
+ k
[
ΠR + ΠL
2
]{
1 + θ
[
1 −
(
1
2
)−1]}
, (6.1)
ΠE2 = ΠR + kθ
(
ΠL − ΠR) if R is incumbent, (6.2)
ΠE2 = ΠL + kθ
(
ΠR − ΠL) if L is incumbent, (6.3)
where we have made use of Π i1 = Π i2 = Π i, i = {L, R}, from (3).
Given the private sector’s subjective expectations of inflation, we can
now derive the unemployment rate in the first period of administration of
a newly elected government. By substituting (3) and (6.1) back into (1), the
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postelection deviation of unemployment from its natural rate, if party Rwins
the election, is
UR1 − UN = a
(
ΠE1 − ΠR1
)
= a
2
4
(bL − bR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ALESINA EFFECT
+ a
2
4
(bL + bR)kθ
[
1 −
(
1
2
)−1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AMBIGUITY EFFECT
. (7.1)
If instead party L wins, the corresponding postelection deviation is
UL1 − UN = a
(
ΠE1 − ΠL1
)
= a
2
4
(bR − bL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ALESINA EFFECT
+ a
2
4
(bL + bR)kθ
[
1 −
(
1
2
)−1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
AMBIGUITY EFFECT
. (7.2)
When party R (or L) wins the election, we can decompose the deviation of
the actual rate of unemployment from its natural rate into two parts. The first
term on the right-hand side of (7.1) (or 7.2) is equivalent to what we would
obtain in Alesina (1987); we call it the Alesina effect. The second term on the
right-hand side of (7.1) (or 7.2) occurs only if a fraction of the population,
k > 0, is not ambiguity-neutral, here equivalent to  = 1; we call this term the
ambiguity effect20. Of course, given that bL > bR > 0, if party R is elected and
k = 0, there is a postelection slump, because the electoral uncertainty has
caused expected inflation to be higher than actual inflation. For a positive but
sufficiently small value of k, the postelection slump is smaller (bigger) when
the k decision-makers are ambiguity-prone (-averse). Figure 2 illustrates.
We can explain these results intuitively as follows. If the k > 0 decision
makers are ambiguity-prone (-averse), they tend to underestimate (over-
estimate) the probability of victory for both parties L and R, as long as
s(pL) = (1/2){1 + θ[1 − (1/2)−1]} = s(1 − pL) < 1/2 (> 1/2) for  < 1 ( > 1)
and pL = 1/2. As a consequence, expected inflation is smaller (larger) than
for k = 0, and thus the deflation surprise is also smaller (larger). In other
words, “optimism” (that is, ambiguity proneness) on the part of the decision-
makers with respect to the likelihood they assign to their worst election
outcome (i.e., that the high-inflation, left-wing party wins the election) is
good for postelection employment: optimism induces them to expect less
than average postelection inflation, which implies a smaller surprise if the
right wins, and thus a smaller slump, or equivalently, a bigger surprise if the
left wins, and thus a bigger boom.
20 The ambiguity term in (7.1)–(7.2) depends on the average inflation bias of the two gov-
ernments, not on partisanship per se: an increase in partisanship that leaves the mean in-
flation bias unaffected does not change this term. This result depends on assuming both
a loss function linear in unemployment and pL = 1/2.
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Figure 2
Postelection Outcome at t = 1, when Party R has won the Election and
pL = 1/2
Note: R = party R has won the election; 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 denotes objective ambiguity; assuming
that the probability anchor is pL = 1/2, ambiguity proneness (aversion) implies k > 0 and
 < 1 ( > 1). SRPC = short-run Phillips curve under different attitudes towards ambiguity.
Alternatively, consider the inflation-policy game as one in which the
government’s strategy is inflation and the wage-setters’ is expected
inflation. From (3), the government plays the dominant strategy
π i = abi/2, i = {L, R}; from (6.1), the wage-setters’ best-reply function is
πi = cπE − π−i, c ≡ 2
{
1 + kθ[1 − (1/2)−1]}−1 > 0, and i = −i. The game ex-
hibits strategic complementarities from the wage-setters’ viewpoint and
negative externalities; with pL = 1/2, ambiguity proneness implies that the
wage-setters’ best replyhas a slopegreater thanunity.Hence, theywill choose
a lower strategy by expecting less inflation for a given inflation strategy of
the government than in the case of ambiguity-neutral behavior21.
21 Diagrammatically, the wage-setters’ positively sloped best-reply function becomes
steeper (or flatter) in the (π i, πE) space as they become more ambiguity-prone (or
ambiguity-averse) in the case of losses. This result is consistent with Eichberger and
Kesley’s (1999) analysis of the strategic role of uncertainty in two-agent models.
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Turning back to (7.1)–(7.2), if the degrees of objective ambiguity and
ambiguity preference are high (i.e., if θ is close to unity, and – provided
pL = 1/2 – if  is close to zero, respectively), and if the fraction k of
ambiguity-prone decision makers is also high, then it is even possible that
the election of party R will give rise to a postelection boom, rather than to
a slump. For instance, if we assume θ = 2/3 = k and  = 1/2, then from (7.1)
we have a postelection boom when party R wins if 1 < bL/bR < 1. 451265,
i.e., if there are small differences in preferences between parties. The impli-
cations of ambiguity for the first period of the partisan business cycle are
summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 (Ambiguity and partisan business cycle) Assume that the de-
cision-makers perceive inflation as a loss. Assume also that pL is uniformly
distributed, so that the anchor value of the probability is pL = 1/2. For given party
preferences bL > bR ≥ 0:
1.1. When party R wins the election: (i) if all of the decision-makers are ambiguity-
neutral, (k = 0), there is a postelection Alesina slump; (ii) if a fraction k > 0 of the de-
cision makers are ambiguity-prone (-averse), then there is a smaller (larger) slump
than in Alesina (1987), and the higher the subjective degree of ambiguity prone-
ness (aversion), the smaller (larger) the slump; (iii) if the fraction k > 0 is sufficiently
large, the degree of ambiguity proneness is sufficiently high ( → 0), and the de-
gree of objective ambiguity is also high (θ → 1), then there can be a postelection
boom, provided that the difference between the parties’ preferences bL, bR is suf-
ficiently small.
1.2. When party L wins the election: (i) if all of the decision-makers are ambiguity-
neutral (k = 0), there is a postelection Alesina boom; (ii) if a fraction k > 0 of the
decision-makers is ambiguity-prone (-averse), then there is a larger (smaller) boom
than in Alesina (1987), and the higher the subjective degree of ambiguity prone-
ness (aversion), the larger (smaller) the boom.
Proof. Directly from (7.1) and (7.2). 
We consider next the implications of ambiguity for the time series of un-
employment. After the election has occurred, if party R is in power, the
decision-makers revise their probability anchor downward to pL = 0. Using
(6.2) in (1), the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate in period
t = 2 is
UR2 − UN = a
(
ΠE2 − ΠR2
) = (a2
2
)
kθ
[
bL − bR] ≥ 0. (8.1)
If party L is in power, the decision-makers revise their probability an-
chor upward to pL = 1. Using (6.3) in (1), the corresponding deviation in
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period t = 2 is
UL2 − UN = a
(
ΠE2 − ΠL2
) = (a2
2
)
kθ
[
bR − bL] ≤ 0. (8.2)
From (8.1) [and (8.2)], if objective ambiguity has not disappeared after the
election (θ > 0), then inflation is still lower [or higher] than expected: there is
a slump [boom] when party R [L] is in power, as long as bL > bR. The reason
is that the k decision-makers who are not ambiguity-neutral are unsure that
the incumbent party will implement its time-consistent inflation policy: they
assign some positive probability weight to the outcome that the inflation
policy of the defeated party will be implemented instead; see (6.2) for R
[(6.3) for L]22. However, if objective ambiguity has disappeared after the
election(θ = 0), unemployment will return to its natural rate, with a second-
period recovery [recession] if party R [L] is in power.
In which situations is it more likely that objective ambiguity will not
disappear after the election?Weargue that thismaybe the case for a coalition
government, or when the party gains power after a long spell in opposition,
or when the party is actually new or has a new, reforming leadership, or
when the situation is such that the decision-makers act as if they assigned
a positive probability to the occurrence of a sudden and unforeseen event,
like the resignation of a political leader following a scandal, the leader’s
death, or a war. In all of these cases, the reputation of the government for
being able to implement its policy, equation (3), can be weak, and objective
ambiguity θ > 0 can persist. It is in these situations that (8.1) and (8.2) will be
more pertinent. Moreover, note that small degrees of objective ambiguity,
or a small fraction of non-ambiguity-neutral decision-makers, will generate
small deviations of unemployment from its natural rate in the second period.
An example of the time series of unemployment for partyR under ambiguity
proneness (thick lines) and under Alesina (1987) (dot–dash lines) is depicted
in Figure 3.
These results are summarized in the following
Proposition 2 (Unemployment persistence) Assume that, after the election,
the probability anchor is revised upward (downward) to unity (zero) if party L (R)
wins. Then, for given party preferences bL > bR ≥ 0:
2.1. If objective ambiguity has disappeared after the election (θ = 0), unemployment
will return to its natural rate.
2.2. If objective ambiguity has not disappeared after the election (0 < θ < 1), unem-
ployment can permanently deviate from its natural rate. There will be a slump
22 This is our interpretation of the claim that “...the direction of adjustment must be due in
part to the value of [the anchor]. Indeed, when [the anchor] equals zero...the adjustment,
if there is one, must be upward; when [the anchor] equals one, the adjustment must be
downward” (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985, p. 436).
Anna Maffioletti and Michele Santoni400
Figure 3
Ambiguity and the Political Business Cycle when Party R is in Office
Note: R = party R has won the election. 1 = first period of tenure; 2 = second period of
tenure. Dash-dot lines: time series of unemployment under Alesina (1987). Thick lines:
time series under ambiguity proneness and persistence of objective ambiguity after the
election.
(boom) when party R (L) is in office, which implies persistence in the time series of
unemployment for k > 0. Small degrees of objective ambiguity (small values of θ)
will cause small deviations of the actual rate of unemployment from its natural rate.
Proof. Directly from (8.1)–(8.3). 
3.Ambiguity and Preference Convergence
The main result of the rational partisan theory is that the election of party
R (L) generates lower (higher) than expected inflation, and thus a postelec-
tion slump (boom), when the decision-makers have rational expectations.
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However, if the time-consistent inflation policies of the two parties were the
same, the private sector would have perfect foresight, and unemployment
would never deviate from its natural rate. Therefore, the rational partisan
theory predicts that the political business cycle completely disappears when
the parties’ preferences converge to a common value, i.e., bL → bR = b > 0.
In the introduction, we have argued that convergence in objectives be-
tween the new free-market left and the liberal right seems to have been
occurring, especially in Europe, during the 1990s. The predictions of our
model for this case are summarized in the following
Proposition 3 (Preference convergence) Assume that the relative preferences
for inflation and unemployment of parties L and R converge to a common value,
i.e., bL → bR = b > 0. Then, provided that the anchor probability value is pL = 1/2,
and that, with objective ambiguity θ > 0, a fraction k > 0 of the population is ambi-
guity-prone (-averse):
3.1. (i) There is a postelection boom (slump); (ii) the deviation from the natural rate
of unemployment is the smaller, the smaller is the common-policy time-consistent
inflation rate, the smaller is the fraction of ambiguity-prone (-averse) decision-
makers, and the smaller is the amount of objective ambiguity.
3.2. After the postelection boom (slump), unemployment will return to its natural
rate.
Proof. 3.1 (i): Using either (7.1) or (7.2), it follows that
lim
bL→bR=b
U1 − UN =
(
a2
2
b
)
kθ
[
1 −
(
1
2
)−1]
,
whose sign is negative (positive) for < 1 ( > 1). (ii) follows by direct inspec-
tion of the expression above, noting that the common-policy time-consistent
inflation rate is given by the first factor in parentheses.
3.2: Using (8.1) or (8.2), we have limbL→bR=b U2 − UN = 0 . 
If a fraction k > 0 of wage-setters is ambiguity-prone (-averse), our model
predicts that the political business cycle will not disappear, provided that
θ > 0. The intuitive explanation is similar to that given for Proposition 2:
if – notwithstanding preference convergence – objective ambiguity does not
disappear, say because the wage-setters assign a positive probability to the
occurrence of a sudden and unforeseen event, then the ambiguity-prone
(-averse) decision-makers adjust downward (upward) the probability of vic-
tory for any party, implying they will expect lower (higher) than average
inflation. Before the election, they will set a too low (high) nominal wage
rate for the next period: regardless of which party will be in power, the actual
postelection inflation rate will lower (raise) the real wage, and unemploy-
ment will be reduced (increased).
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Note that our interpretation of the role of ambiguity in Propositions 2 and
3 above allows us to draw a parallel between our approach and the literature
onDownsianparty competitionwhere voters face a risky choice, being uncer-
tain about the two parties’ location along a one-dimensional policy space23.
This approach, stemming from Downs (1957, p. 136) and Shepsle (1972),
and more recently adopted by Alesina and Cukierman (1990), considers the
incentives of candidates to purposely behaving “as equivocally as possible
about their stands,” depending on both the risk attitude of voters and the
candidates’ objectives. In this literature, there is a risky environment because
voters are imperfectly informed about the preferences of politicians, and the
risky party is represented as a random variable with a known probability
distribution24.
In the currentmodel, lack of information aswell as conflicting information
implies that, although politicians may state unequivocally the same prefer-
ences about inflation and unemployment before the election, wage-setters
may still perceive uncertainty about the electoral outcome (say, they can
neither rule out nor assign a precise probability to the event “inflationary
financing of a war by the newly elected government”), and thus about the
inflation policy being implemented after the election. In other words, the
persistence of uncertainty about the electoral outcome implies that the in-
dividual perception of the likelihood of the universal event is not equal to
the likelihood attached to the victory of the right plus that of the left. As
a consequence, the decision-makers do not assign probability equal to one to
the common time-consistent inflation rate, that is, to the common outcome
in the case of victory for either party. It is the mere presence of electoral
uncertainty that causes a political business cycle, even with full preference
convergence25.
However, note that small deviations from ambiguity neutrality generate
small postelection deviations from the natural rate of unemployment. Finally,
note that, when the anchor pR = 1/2, the experimental evidence suggests that
most of the subjects are ambiguity-neutral; see Camerer and Weber (1992).
Under the assumptions of our model, this would imply a small value of k
and a small ambiguity effect, ceteris paribus. However, with a nonuniform
probability distribution, non-ambiguity-neutral behavior has been found to
23 We thank an anonymous referee for having alerted us to this. Note that “uncertainty”
and “ambiguity” are synonyms for risk in this literature; see Shepsle (1972, footnote 25,
p. 559) for a discussion, and footnote 5 above.
24 Enelow and Hinich (1981) see the source of voters’ uncertainty not only in the candi-
dates’ unknown position, but also in the voters’ process of simplifying the candidates’
position along the left–right dimension with a shorthand label (such as “right,” “center,”
“left”).
25 This is equivalent to saying that the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives may
be violated.
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be prevalent; see, e.g.,DiMauro andMaffioletti (1996). In such a case, we can
anticipate that the size of the ambiguity effects will not be trivial according
to our model26.
3.1. Central-Bank Independence
Alesina and Gatti (1995, p. 199) show that an independent and inflation-
averse central bank, which is jointly appointed by the parties before the
election, can eliminate output variability arising from electoral uncertainty,
and can reduce average inflation. That is, with rational expectations, conver-
gence in objectives, bL → bR = b, is a perfect substitute for the appointment
of an independent central bank with preference parameter bˆ < b, at least for
disposing of the political business cycle. However, if k > 0 and  = 1, our
model puts forward a stronger case for central-bank independence: even if
the central bank had the same preference for inflation as the political parties,
the higher is its independence frompolitical pressures, the lower is the degree
of objective ambiguity θ, and the smaller is the postelection boom or slump.
Now, it is well known that central-bank independence can be measured by
several institutional characteristics, such as the length of term in office for
bank governors, the degree of partisan political influence in decision-making,
and the central banker’s preference with regard to inflation, or its “degree
of conservatism.” Our model suggests that objective ambiguity, and thus
fluctuations in unemployment, can disappear (θ → 0) if the decision-makers
perceive central-bank independence as a stable and permanent feature of
monetary policymaking. Institutional arrangements (e.g., constitutional laws
establishing the central bank’s objectives and instruments; long term lengths
for the governors) that insulate monetary policy from short-run political
pressures would help to eliminate the political business cycle: convergence
in objectives may not be sufficient for this purpose.
3.2. Ambiguity and the Timing of Contract Negotiation
One major problem with Alesina’s (1987) approach is that the results of
a political business cycle depend on wage-setters signing contracts before
an election whose timing is fully known. As Garfinkel and Glazer (1994,
p. 169) put it, “why should rational, forward-looking decision agents lock
themselves into nominal contracts before the resolution of electoral uncer-
tainty ... insofar as elections are predictable events” rather than postponing
26 In an appendix, available on request from the authors, we assume that the expected value
of the probability distribution is different from one-half. Using restrictions that are con-
sistent with the existing experimental evidence, we can predict nontrivial ambiguity ef-
fects.
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contract negotiations until after the elections? Garfinkel and Glazer (1994)
present U.S. evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
We observe that different attitudes towards ambiguity on the part of
the decision-makers may explain why some trade unions may prefer not
to postpone, whereas other trade unions may prefer to postpone, contract
negotiations until after the elections. If the trade unions are ambiguity-loving,
theywill prefer signing contracts before the election (i.e., taking the uncertain
gamble) to waiting for the resolution of electoral uncertainty. However, if
they are ambiguity-averse, they may prefer waiting until the uncertainty is
resolved (i.e., not taking the gamble). In terms of our model, the endogenous
timing of negotiation is still consistentwith the idea that electoral uncertainty
may generate a political business cycle, provided that the proportion of
ambiguity-loving decision-makers is sufficiently large.
4. Conclusion
This paper has introduced nonrational decision-makers into a stripped-down
version of Alesina’s (1987) two-party model of the political business cycle.
In the current model, the decision-makers perceive inflation as a loss, and
the lack of information or conflicting information about the probability of
election victory for one of the two parties can generate electoral ambiguity.
Following Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), the decision-makers react to this
uncertainty by using decision weights, rather than subjective probabilities, in
order to form their estimates of the likelihood of victory for one party. The
decision weights are centered on a probability anchor equal to one-half from
a unitary uniform distribution. This approach to ambiguity includes rational
expectations as a special case.
The paper has shown that, even in the presence of full convergence in
objectives, there is the possibility of a postelection boom (slump) when the
decision-makers are ambiguity-prone (-averse), provided that there is still
ambiguity as regards the election results. In addition, if there are partisan
differences among politicians, the paper shows that the subjective perception
of ambiguity can change the size and the sign of the political business cycle.
For example, if some decision-makers are ambiguity-prone (i.e.,  < 1 here),
the model predicts a smaller postelection slump than in Alesina when the
low-inflation, right-wing party wins the election. However, if the fraction of
the ambiguity-prone subjects is sufficiently large (i.e., if k is large here), the
victory of the right could generate a boom. This special case is potentially
interesting insofar as it differentiates the predictions of the model from
Alesina (1987) andHibbs (1977),where postelection booms occur only when
the left gains power: this model can predict situations that are explained
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neither by the partisanmodel nor by Nordhaus’s (1975) opportunistic model
(predicting postelection slumps).
The next step is trying to test the predictions of the model empirically.
Firstly, we would like to understand whether or not wage-setters react to
uncertainty. In a series of experiments (some of which are reported in Maffi-
oletti and Santoni, 2000) designed to elicit ambiguity preference in a sample
of Italian trade-union delegates and leaders, we find some evidence of am-
biguity reaction, especially when wage-setters are facing real, as opposed to
fictitious, uncertainty. Second, we would like to find some direct evidence
of an ambiguity effect in macroeconomic data. The experimental literature
finds that subjects exhibit ambiguity reaction for extreme values of the prob-
ability anchor; see Camerer and Weber (1992). This seems to suggest that
one place to look for evidence of an ambiguity effect would be in postelec-
tion economies for which either election defeats or landslides were widely
forecast. One problem, however, is how to measure empirically the degree
of ambiguity involved in these situations (namely the degree of objective
ambiguity θ). We shall leave this task for future work.
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